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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for specific performance of a written
agreement dated November 20, 1978 between the Defendant, JOHN
NEW AND ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah Corporation (hereinafter in
this brief referred to for purposes of convenience as New) and
Plaintiff, NIXON & NIXON, INC., a Utah corporation (hereinafter
in this brief referred to for purposes of convenience as Nixon),
in which agreement New agreed to sell to Nixon and Nixon agreed to
purchase from New certain undeveloped real property in Weber
County, Utah. Nixon's Complaint was filed on June 6, 19 7 9.
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(R-1).

-2New filed an Answer to the Complaint on July 12, 1979, generally
admitting the contract, denying its duty to specifically perform
the contract and alleging that New and Nixon were joint venturers
in development of said property. (R-12).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried in the District Court of Weber County,
Utah, wherein it was filed, before the Honorable Calvin Gould,
sitting without a jury, on February 14, 1980.

At the conclusion

of the trial, Judge Gould took the case under advisement.

There-

after, on February 28, 1980, Judge Gould made and entered the
following Memorandum Decision:
The Court holds that the contract is so ambiguous that
the rights of the defendant cannot be ascertained or enforced exce~t at the whim or caprice of the plaintiff as
to the date of filing final plats, etc. The contract is
therefore unenforceable~
Plaintiff may have ~u<!gment for amounts paid and defendant may have Judgment voiding the purported contract.
No Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or Judgment were
entered on said Memorandum Decision within the time for appeal
of a final judgment under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and so, to protect the record, Nixon filed a Notice of Appeal on
March 28, 1980 from Judge Gould's Memorandum Decision of Februa ry 2 8 , 1 9 80 . ( R- 2O) •
Thereafter, on June 9, 1980, Judge Goul'd made and entered
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formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and

~

Judgment

holding said Agreement vague and ambiguous, restoring the
parties to their

status before the Agreement, relieving New

of any duty to convey the property to Nixon and awarding Nixon
a money judgment for the principal amount theretofore paid by
Nixon on the Contract in the amount of $76,928.63 and interest
thereon to the date of the Judgment in the amount of $20,562.83.
(R 34- 37).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Nixon requests that this Court reverse the Judgment entered
by the Trial Court and direct the Trial Court to enter Judgment
in favor of Nixon specifically enforcing 4nd directing New to
comply with the Agreement between the parties dated November 20,
1978.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
New was the owner of the real property subject of said
Agreement of November 20, 1978 prior to the date of said Agreement.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit "B").

New had mortgaged the property

to Commercial Security Bank (hereinafter Bank), had defaulted
on said mortgage, the Bank had foreclosed the Mortgage and had a
sheriff's sale thereon.

(T. 127, lines 4-24).

The six-month
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right of redemption from the sheriff's sale expired November
20, 1978 (T. 128, lines 26-28).
New undertook, during the six-month redemption period, to
find a buyer for the property who would pay enough to redeem
the property from the sheriff's sale and to enable New to realize
some money from the sale.

(T. 127, lines 25-27).

In pursuance of its efforts to sell the property, New came
in contact with one Jerry Olson (hereinafter Olson).

New told

Olson he was in trouble on the property and solicited Olson's
help in finding a Buyer.
New refused, preferring

Olson requested a formal listing which
rat~er

to give Olson a letter guaranteein

Olson a commission if he sold the property. (T. 127, lines 1-30
and 128, lines 1-12).

A letter agreeing to pay a commission was

given by New on October 26, 1978.

(See Defendant's Exhibit "2").

No Buyer had been found for the property by New, Olson or
anyone else by a date two (2) days before the redemption period
expired.

(Testimony of John New, T. 130, lines 18- 23) .

When Ols

informed New that the parties he had been negotiating with would
not buy the property, Olson told New that Nixon would buy the
property.

(Testimony of John New, T. 130, lines 24-30).

Nixon

subsequently offered to purchase the property for $130,000.00
of which approximately $76,000.00 would be used to redeem the

property from sheriff's sale and the balance of $54,000.00 of whi
would be paid to New" ... at a later date."

(Testimony of John
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New, T. 133, lines 3-15).
Nixon and New then met on November 20, 1978, the date on
which the redemption period expired, in the office of New's
attorney, Donald C. Hughes, Jr. (hereinafter Hughes).
not represented by legal counsel at this meeting.

Nixon was

(Testimony

of Jack Nixon, T. 61, lines 4-15 and T. 62, lines 1-6).

The

parties there and then proceeded to negotiate the terms of the
contract ..

(Testimony of Jack Nixon, T. 62, lines 10-13).

One

of Nixon's principal concerns was --obtaining a clear title to the
property.

(Testimony of Jack Nixon, T. 62, lines 14-17).

At this meeting, Hughes gave Nixon a copy of a preliminary
title report on the property.

A copy of the title report was

introduced into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit "B".

The title

report showed numerous judgment liens against the property (See
Plaintiff's Exhibit "B")

The parties went over the report one

item at a time and Hughes and New assured Nixon on each item that
the various judgments and liens had either been paid or provision
made for removing them from the title to the property and penciled
notations made in the left hand margins as to the disposition of
each item.

(Testimony of Nixon T. 63, lines 13-17).

,\ t the

trial New's counsel asked what Nixon intended to show by Plaintiff'
Exhibit "B" and the penciled notations in the margin of Schedule
B thereunder.

To this inquiry, Nixon's attorney replied:

"We intend to show that they had represented the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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title to the property was either clear or could be
made clear, and that they would give us a clear, unencumbered and marketable title to the property. That
was their representation."
Whereupon New' s attorney stated:
that.

"There is no dispute about

(Testimony of Nixon T. 64, line 29).
The negotiations and drafting were done under pressure of

the 5:00 p.m. deadline for redemption and the contract which is
the subject of this dispute was finally signed just in·time for
Nixon, New and Hughes to go to the sheriff's office and redeem

th,

property with money paid by Nixon just ahead of the 5:00 p.m.
redemption deadline.

(Testimony of Jack Nixon, T. 69, lines 1-19

The contract between the parties was introduced as Plaintiff
Exhibit "A" at the trial.

The contract provides for a purchase

price of $130,000.00 of which $76,928.73 was to be paid down and
was in fact paid
In paragraph 2,

to redeem the property from sheriff's sale.
th~

contract provides that:

2. Buyer shall convey to Seller title to the described
property, free and clear of all liens and shall provide for
Buyer a policy of title insurance, insuring the title of
Buyer.
New's counsel stipulated at the trial that this paragraph
contained a scrivener's error and should, in fact, have said "Sel
shall convey to Buyer ... "

(T. 4 2, lines 16- 29).

The contract then prov1ded, among other things as follows:
3. Buyer shall use best efforts to prepare a subdivision
plat and proceed with engineering and development. of the
property at a commercially reasonable speed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Six mo~ths from the filing of the final plat, Buyer
par t9 ~e~ler the difference between the redemption
price paid in1t1ally and One Hundred and Thirty Thousand
Dollars ($130,000.00).
4.

sh~ll

9. Buyer shall execute a note in favor of Seller consistent
with the terms of this agreement. In the event, Buyer
has not paid the Seller the amounts due and payable hereunder
within four years from the filing of final plat, the note
shall be in default and Seller may proceed according to
lP.

Subsequent to the redemption, Jack and Ezra Nixon appeared
with Hughes and John New on two occasions in Judge Hyde's Court
in Ogden to settle an issue relative to one of the liens on the
property.

(Testimony of Jack Nixon, T. 70, lines 11-30 and 71,

lines 1-15).

Immediately following the second court hearing the

Nixons, New and Hughes had the following conversation:

Q.

Did ybu have a conversation with Mr. New and Mr. Hughes

then following that?
A.

Yeah, we talked right here on this floor for a little

bit, and we headed back over to Hughes' office.

And I said

now what do we need to do to get this thing wrapped up?
And in fact, we stopped for the light right here on the
corner of Kiesel, I guess it is Kiesel, anyway this little
short street right here north of the courthouse, and we
were talking there, John and I and dad.

And John and I

said then--! said Don, now what do we need to do now to
get the deed and title policy on this property.

And he

said well, he says, I have got to file the redemption
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certificate.

And he said I have got to get the title compar

now to· give us--issue us a new policy of title insurance
showing these liens are cleaned up on it.
how long that would be.

And I asked him

And he again assured me that it

would be shortly forthcoming, within 30 days or so.

And

I said well, get that note typed up for John, and let's
get it signed and get this thing put to bed.
I will do it.

And he said

(T. 71, lines 18-30 and 72, lines 1-7).

In fact, Hughes never

prepa~~d

and submit:t_e_d a _note to Nixon

as provided in paragraph 9 of the agreement,

althoug~

Nixon

at all times ready, willing and able to sign the note.
of Nixon T. 69, lines 27-30 and 70, lines 1-10).

w~

(Testimorr

Nor did New

ever tender to Nixon a clear title and title insurance policy
t o Nixon .

(Test i mo n y o f John New , T . 74 , 1 in es 26 - 30 and 75 ,

lines 1-5).
Following the signing of the contract, Nixon took some preliminary steps to develope the property even though clear title t
the property had not passed to it.

These included hiring two lan

designers in January, 19 79 (T. 7 5, 1 ines 11- 21) , hi ring an engine
in March (T. 76, lines 6-22), preparation of subdivision sketches

and soil tests (T. 76, lines 23-27) and going to the property twi
with the engineer (T. 77, lines 11-27).
In May of 1979, Nixon discovered that New was proceeding
to

subdivide the property subject of said contract as though
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was still the owner thereof.

(T. 77, lines 28-30 and T. 78, lines

1- 5) .

When Jack Nixon contacted John New to see why he was doing
this, John New replied " ... that's my property ... " and" ... I am
going to develope it ... "

(T. 80, lines 11 and 12).

Jack Nixon

then stated he had purchased the property and made a down payment
to which John New replied" ... ! am going to consider it a loan."
( T . 80 , 1 in es 2 6 and 2 7 ) .
Jack Nixon thereupon caused a title search of the property
to be made which disclosed that title to the property was in
New and that the title was encumbered by a mortgage, a mechanics
lien, a Federal Tax lien,

numerous judgment liens and a possible

boundary conflict. A copy of this title report is a part of the
record as Plaintiff's Exhibit "F". On June 4, 1980, Nixon filed a
lis pendens against the property (Plaintiff's Exhibit "G")
and on June 6, 1980 filed an action for specific performance
of the contract.
The case was tried to Judge Calvin Gould on February 14,
1980 and on February 22, 1980 Judge Gould gave a written i\lemorandum
Decision (R. 19).

The Memorandum Decision did not direct the

preparation of Findings of Fact or a Judgment and Decree and
so Nixon, in order to protect its record, treated the Judgment
as a final judgment and appealed

therefrom.

Thereafter New's attorney prepared proposed Findings of Fact
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and Conclusions of Law and a proposed Judgment.

Nixon made writte

objection thereto and filed a copy of said objection with Judge
Gould (R

28~30).

On June 4, 1980, counsel for both parties appear

before Judge Gould on his order and reviewed the proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree and Judge
Gould thereupon, on June 9, 1980, made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment and Decree. (R 34-37).
In fact two Judgments were entered by Judge Gould.

The first

Judgment follows the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as
a part of the same document as the Finding of Fact and Conclusions
of Law .

( R- 3 6)

-The second Judgment is the one prepared by Mr. Richards,
New's attorney, in April, 1980. While the two Judgments vary sligh·
tney both have the effect of declaring the contract void for ambi.
(
guity.
Aft.er the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgmen·
were

entered~

Nixon moved this Court to augment the record on

appeal to include said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Judgments and to treat Nixon's appeal from the Trial Court's
Memorandum Decision as an appeal from both

the Trial Court's Memo:

andum Decision of February 28, 1980 and from its Judgments of June
9, 1980.

This motion was granted and an order entered thereon.
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POINT 1. THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT AMBIGUOUS
AND VAGUE AND THERE IS SUFFICIENT DEFINITNESS IN THE CONTRACT
TO WARRANT SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT THEREOF.
The provision of the contract which the trial Court apparently found to be vague and ambiguous was paragraph 3 which
provides:
3. Buyer shall use best efforts to prepare a subdivision
Plat and proceed with engineering and development of the
property- at a commercially reasonable speed.
(Plaintiff's
Exh i b i t " C" ) .

Because this provision did not specify a time by which
Nixon would prepare a subdivision plat and because the contract
did not require Nixon to pay New money until six months after the
subdivision plat was filed the Court concluded that Nixon could
forestall paying New indefinately, simply by not filing a subdivision plat.

From this the Trial Court concluded, "The contract

i~

so ambiguous that the·rights of the Defendant cannot be ascertained
or enforced except at the whim or caprice of the Plaintiff, and
to enforce the contract as the Plaintiff now requests would be to
deprive the Defendant of any equity he may have had in the property
(Conclusions of Law, R-36).
The following foundational principles are relevant to this
case:
1.

"It is fundamental that doubtful language in a contract
should be interpeted most strongly against the party
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-12who has selected that ·language, especially where he
seeks to use such language to defeat the contract or
it~ operation ... also, in case of doubt or ambiguity
a contract will be construed most strongly against the
party who drew or prepared it, or whose attorney drew
or prepared it.
(17 Am. Jur. 2nd on Contracts, Section
276 P. 689-90). See also Bryant vs. Deseret News Publi~hi
Company (Utah) 233 P.2d 35 .
The contract in question in this case was drawn and prepared
by New's attorney (Testimony of New, T. 150, lines 24-28. Testimany of Hughes, T. 116, lines 25-30).
2.

" ... if a contract is capable of a construction which
will make it valid, legal, effective, and enforceable,
it will be given that construction if the contract is
ambiguous or uncertain. A constru-ction which renders
the contract valid is preferred to one which renders
it invalid, and it will not be -construed so as to be
invalid unless that construction is required by the
terms of the agreement in the light of the surrounding
circumstances." (17/Am. Jur. 2d on Contracts, Section
254, pg. 648-650). See also Schofield vs. ZCMI (Utah)
39 p. 2d 34 2.

"A contract being construed is to be considered as a
whole and the meaning gathered from the entire context,
and not from particular words, phrases, or clauses,
or from detached or isolated portions of the contract ....
Moreover, the entire agreement is to be considered,
to determine the meaning of each part . . . . All clauses
and provisions of the contract should, if possible,
be so construed as to harmonize with one another, and
all the language of a contract should be construed so
as to subserve, and not subvert, the general intention
of the parties. -The whole agreement should, if possible,
be construed so as to conform to an evident consistent
purpose. Where a contract as a whole discloses a given
intention and certain words or clauses would, if taken
literally, defeat the intention, they will be interpreted
~f possible, so as to be consistent with the general
intent." (17 Arn. Jur. 2d on Contracts, Section 258,
pg. 658-660) .
.
"It is a fundamental rule of contract construction that
the entire contract, and each and all of its parts and
provisions, must be given meaning, and force and effect,
it that can consistently and reasonably be done. An
~nterpre~a~ion w~ich gives reasonable meaning to all
its provisions will be preferred to one which leaves
a portion of the writing useless or inexplicable. So
far as reasonably possible, effect will he crim:~n +,...
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all the language and to every word, expression, phrase,
and clause of the agreement. A construction will not
be given to one part of a contract which will annul
another part, unless such a result is fairly inescapable .. ·
(17 Am. Jur. 2d on Contracts, Section 259, pg. 660-662).
The generally accepted definition of ambiguity in a contract
is:
... an uncertainty of meaning in the terms of a
written instrument. It means wanting clearness or
definiteness; difficult to comprehend or distinguish; of doubtful import. State Bank of Wilbur
~· Phillips (Washington) 119 P.2cr;-Q64T.
Ambiguity in a written instrument does not appear until
application of pertinent rules of interpretation to the face of
the instrument leaves it genuinely uncertain which of two or more
meanings is the proper meaning.

Dearborn Motors Credit Corp.

vs. Neel, (Kansas) 337 P.Zd 992.
Taken as a whole the contract in this case is not ambiguous.
It clearly

express~s

a purchase price of $130,000.00

4) and a down payment of

$76,~28. 7~

(paragraph 1),

(pa~agraph

Because

there were liens against the property which had to be cleared
before the property could be developed the parties established
by the contract a framework by which the property could be
developed and, as developed, New could be paid.

Thus the contract

first provides that New would convey to Nixon a clear title to
the property and a title insurance policy.

Hughes testified in

answer to Mr. Hoggan's question'' ... you wouldn't expect anyone
to proceed

~ith

development of the property and the expenditure

of a large sum of money until he had clear title to it, would
you?" as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-14No, I think he would want assurance of his return. (T. 125
lines 24-28).
Under a fair interpretation of all provisions of the contrac1
and construing the contract so as to give validity to all of its
provisions, the contract is not ambiguous.

The provisions the

trial court found to be ambiguous are not of duplicitous meaning.
Taken in the context of the entire contract they simply require
Nixon to begin and proceed with development of the property after
New has tendered clear marketable title to Nixon.

The Trial Court

in effect, ignored the provisions of the contract requiring New·
to give a clear title, leap-frogged these provisions, took the
provisions requiring Nixon to develope the property out of the
context of the contract and, standing thereon alone, declared
those provisions vague and ambiguous.
Had the Trial Court applied the rules of construction requiri
all provisions of the contract to be construed together and favor1
an interpretation which validated instead of invalidated the contr
the seeming ambiguity would not have existed.

The contract, const

ed as a whole, shows an orderly manner in which the parties were
to accomplish their purposes, i.e. first clear the title, then
begin to develope the property and if, in the course of developmen
unforseen obstacles arose, adjust the Sellers equity by an amount
necessary to solve the unforseen difficulties.

If the contract

was not as artfully drafted as would be desired it must be remembered that it was drafted under intense time pressure by New's
attorney and if there is any question of ambiguity that question
should be resolved against New and in favor of preserving the
parties' bargain, not nullifying it.
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Nixon submits that this Court's recent decision in Reed vs.
Alvey (April 21, 1980) 610 P.2d 1374 is dispositive of the issue
raised by

t~is

appeal.

In the Reed case, one Lambert as agent for Alvey, procurred
an earnest money offer and a $500.00 deposit from Reed to purchase
one of 4 four-plex units which Alvey proposed to construct on
lots at the intersection of Hillview Drive and Ninth East in Salt
Lake City, Utah.

Alvey signed the earnest money agreement and

endorsed the $500.00 deposit to Lambert as payment on his commission.
There were delays in construction of the unit and when Reed couldn't
make contact with Alvey, he filed suit for specific performance of
the earnest money agreement.
The Trial Court held the agreement vague and ambiguous and
declined to order specific performance.

The provisions apparently

relied on by the Trail Court were that the description was uncertain, the specific unit the Plaintiff was to purchase was not identified and the manner for payment stated "terms to be arranged."
This Court stated as follows:
Before specific performance will be employed by the courts
to enforce a contract the terms of the agreement must be
reasonably certain so the parties know what is required of
them, and definite emough that the courts can delineate the
intent of the contracting parties.
The Court then went on to hold that the description, though
" ... concededly vague and incomplete on its face ... defines the
subject matter in question in sufficient detail to support specific
performance."

(Ibid. p. 1377)

On the issue of which lot the Plaintiff had purchased, the
Court found the dealings of the parties had sufficiently established the identity of the lot purchased by Plaintiff.

The Court
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also found that the provision "terms to be arranged" allowed the da
Plaintiff to pay in full upon performance by the Defendant.

~

Finally, where it appeared that the Defendant had encumbere1 to
the property title, this Court stated:

Specific performance of the contract requires· the removal ~
of this encumbrance prior to the Plaintiff taking possessio1
of the property. This can be accomplished either by a
thE
reduction in the purchase price, in the amount of the encum·
brance, or payment of the total price after Defendants remo\ :::
the encumb ranee. (Ibid. p. 13 80)
If the Court on the facts in Reed vs. Alvey can decree speci

~

:.

performance, cert ain~y it can and should in the case at bar find ·"

sufficient definiteness from all the terms of the contract and th ·
dealings of the parties

to spec·ifically enforce the

parties' contract.

POINT II. CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE
PARTIES REQUIRED NEW TO CONVEY A CLEAR TITLE TO NIXON BEFORE
NIXON WAS OBLIGATED TO DEVELOPE THE PROPERTY AND NIXON COULD ;
NOT BE IN DEFAULT ON THE CONTRACT UNTIL IT HAD FAILED OR REFl
ED TO DEVELOPE THE PROPERTY AFTER OBTAINING A CLEAR TITLE
THERETO.
It is an undisputed fact that New did not have clear title
to the property when the contract was entered into.

The title

report, Pla·intiff' s Exhibit "B", shows numerous mortgages and
liens against the property.
It is an undisputed fact that the liens were to be removed
by New and that New would give Nixon a clear title to the property
Certainly it was not Nixon's duty to clear the title. Hughes ackno
ledged that development should not be expected to proceed until
the title was cleared (T. 125, lines 24-28), and that it was his
duty to clear the title (T. 117, lines 1-29).

The title report
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dated May 23, 1979 (Plaintiff's Exhibit "F") shows the title was
never cleared and New testified he had never tendered clear title
to the property to Nixon (T. 150, lines 16-18).
It is an undisputed fact that immediately prior to the date
this suit was commenced, to-wit:

on May 23, 1979, the title to

the property was still heavily encumbered by liens and mortgages
and that most of these liens and mortgages were the same ones that
were against the property when the parties entered into the

contract~

(Compare the title report dated July 28, 1978, Plaintiff's Exhibit
"B" with the title report dated May 23, 1979,

Plaintiff's Exhibit

"F".)

The trial court ignored these facts in construing the contractQ
In effect the court released New from its obligation to convey
a clear title, took one or two provisions of the contract out
of context and concluded that the contract was ambiguous since
it placed no time limit on Nixon developing the property.

In

fact, until Nixon had clear title to the property it was under
no obligation to proceed with development and even though Hughes
admitted it would be unreasonable to expect Nixon to proceed with
development until it had clear title to the property.
In addition, the Court ignored the fact that Nixon had done
considerable work toward beginning development of the property
even though it had not yet received clear title to the property.
(See page 8 of this brief and the reference to the Transcript
there cited.)
POI~T III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXERCISING ITS EQUITABLE
POWERS TO VOID THE CONTRACT IN FAVOR OF NEW INAS:MUCH AS NEW
DID
NOT DO EQUITY.
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It is important to weigh and consider the following:
1.

It was Nixon who had invested $76,928.73 in the property

New's equity, assuming all of it would go into New's pocket and

none of it would go to pay liens against the property, was approx:
rnately $54,000,00.

Nixon stood to lose

more than New in the

deal if development of the property was delayed and Nixon's poten
tial loss was hard cash.

New's loss was of a potential equity

which he would never even had a chance of realizing had Nixon
not contracted with New.

New testified in cross examination as

follows:

Q. (By Hoggan)

Now what would have happened it 5:00 o'clock

had rolled around on Novernher 20 ,· 1978, and you hadn't had
$77,000.00?
A.

It would have become Commercial Security's property,

or whoever bid on it.

Q.

And what would you have gotten out of it?

A.

Nothing.

Q.

Did you have $77,000.00 at 5:0·0 o'clock on November 20,

1978 of your own money?

CT. 148, lines 18-27)

A.

No.

2.

This is a case in equity.

Two fundamental maxims of

equity are: "He who seeks equity must do equity" (27 Arn. Jur.
2d on Equity,

Section 131, P. 660) and "He who comes into equity

must come with clean hands."

(27 Arn. Jur. 2d on Equity, Section

136, P. 666).
New is in violation of both maxims.

New cannot ask the Court

to excercise its equitable powers to in effect rescind its contrac
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wi th Nixon when New has not itself performed the contract by
tendering clear title to the property. New took all of the
benefits of the contract by accepting a down payment which enabled
him to escape loss of the property and his equity therein altogether
by redeeming the property.

It is inequitable conduct on· his part,

after having had the benefit of the contract, to now repudiate it.
Nor can New be said to have clean hands.

New took matters

into his own hands without seeking judicial assistance.

He made

himself the judge of the contract by repudiating it and proceeding
to develope a property he had sold and received almost $77,000.00
on.

Nixon found out about New's action, not from New, but from

its independent sources of information.
CONCLUSION
The contract of the parties, construed as a whole, is not
ambiguous.

It can and should be construed to give it validity

rather than invalidity.

To the extent the contract could be

considered ambiguous, it should have the ambiguity construed against
New, since his attorney prepared it.

The court, in exercise of its

equitable powers should not penalize Nixon and reward New.

Nixon

has done nothing in derogation of the contract, but stands ready
and willing to perform the contract.
nothing to perform the contract.

New, by contrast, has done

The Court should specifically

enforce the contract by requiring New to clear the title to the
property, convey clear title thereto to Nixon by Warranty Deed
and to provide Nixon with a policy of title insurance on the property
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Respectfully submitted,

OLSON, HOGGAN

& SORENSON

/s/ L. Brent Hoggan
L. Brent Hoggan
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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